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Retrievable Images on Social Media
Platforms: A Call for a New Privacy Tort
ZAHRA TAKHSHID†
The recognition of a right of privacy in Warren and
Brandeis’s famous article has long been celebrated and
lamented. It is celebrated because privacy is a central feature
of individual well-being that deserves legal protection. It is
lamented because the protection they contemplated, and that
is actually provided by the law, is quite modest. Modern
technology, especially social media platforms, has only raised
the stakes. Anytime one goes out in public, one risks having
one’s image captured and shared worldwide, leaving us with
little or no control over how we are perceived by others.
This Article argues for the recognition of a new privacy
tort: the tort of unwanted broadcasting. It would allow a
person whose image is, without permission, shared widely on
one or more social media platforms that has an enduring
retrievable character, to recover damages from a person who
posts it. While in some respects novel and far-reaching, the
unwanted broadcasting tort has a solid grounding in privacy
† Reginald F. Lewis Fellow for Law Teaching, Harvard Law School. For helpful
comments and conversations, I am grateful to Benjamin C. Zipursky, Vincent
Blasi, John C.P. Goldberg, Clare Huntington, Amelia J. Uelmen, Olivier Sylvain,
Toni Jaeger-Fine, Randall L. Kennedy, Emory Law S.J.D. Society, participants
of the Yale Law School Information Society Project 7 th Annual Freedom of
Expression Scholars Conference April 2019, Susannah Barton Tobin, and the
2019 Climenko Fellows.
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theory and doctrinal roots in English case law. This Article
also shows that this tort can be fashioned in a manner that
renders it consistent with First Amendment principles.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are in a café enjoying a cup of coffee when
you notice the person sitting at a nearby table is staring at
you. The individual pulls out a cellphone and takes a picture
of you. Before you know it, the individual is posting those
pictures on her social media platform which has a large
audience. Unless you are a public figure who is accustomed
to desired or even undesired attention, you most likely do not
enjoy being the subject in this scenario. You may choose to
either ignore the individual or give up on that coffee and
leave the café. But leaving the café won’t help you from being
in similar situations as long as you remain in a public space.
You inevitably have a lower expectation of privacy in public;
after all, “the timorous may stay at home.”1 But does that
mean you have to consent to your picture becoming available
online and expect to be watched by a thousand followers on
a stranger’s social media account for an indefinite time by
choosing to be in a public space? The minute the individual
posts your picture on their public social media profile, the
nature of your presence in public changes: it is now a
retrievable visibility that can haunt you for years to come
and have many unwanted consequences.
Today, the novel ways that third parties can take
advantage of a simple photo are alarming.2 A New York
Times report on a start-up company called Clearview AI
neatly illustrates this point. Clearview AI accumulated
millions of publicly available pictures of people online to
build up a facial recognition app that would allow the users
to identify strangers. Anyone can simply take a picture of a
stranger walking down the street and upload that image on
the app. The app would then use its database to identify that
stranger. While the use of the app has thus far been limited,

1. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
2. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We
Know It (Jan 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/
clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html.
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it may be soon that similar apps become available to the
public. The app has heavily relied on social media platforms
to collect images. One may argue that the photo scrapping
used by Clearview AI is against the terms of services of
Facebook. However, such violations may keep recurring
regardless of what companies’ terms of services state.
Furthermore, despite the ban on facial recognition
technology in a number of U.S. cities, such as San Francisco,3
the future of the technology is opaque. New ways of using
publicly available images as data can and will become
available. While we can think of ways to address each new
technology as it emerges, the legal system should grant the
privacy of not having any picture online if an individual
chooses so.
This Article asks whether choosing not to have your
picture available online in general, and specifically on social
media platforms, is a protected privacy interest that should
allow individuals to sue for damages when their image has
been intentionally widely broadcasted on social media
platforms without their consent. The Article argues that the
answer is yes. The harm of such image dissemination online
is retrievable visibility that is not addressed by the current
mainstream common law privacy torts.
Unease with unwanted enduring effects of photography
is not new. In 2009, one member of Congress introduced a
bill that would have mandated a clicking sound to serve as a
notice to persons that they are being photographed.4 Some

3. Kate Conger, Richard Fausset, and Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco
Bans Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html; see
also Bruce Schneier, We’re Banning Facial Recognition. We’re Missing the Point,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/opinion/facialrecognition-ban-privacy.html.
4. Camera Predator Alert Act of 2009, H.R. 414, 111th Cong. (2009). The act
would have required “any mobile phone containing a digital camera” to “sound a
tone . . . whenever a photograph is taken with the camera in such phone.” Id. The
act would have further prohibited such a phone from being “equipped with a
means of disabling or silencing such tone or sound.” Id.
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have suggested using an app that would immediately emit a
flash “when sensing a camera lens, thereby ruining the
image.”5 The impracticality of such proposals forces us to
look at the growing body of scholarly literature that focuses
on similar online privacy concerns involving images: scholars
have recognized the phenomenon of widespread video
recording (especially citizen recording v. professional
journalism) and its potential for generating privacy
violations.6 One author called for recognizing a tort of
objectification of crime spectators in light of widespread
video recording of crime scenes, 7 while another introduced a
tort for the misuse of personal information.8 Scholarship has
also focused on online shaming and the importance of laws
5. Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing
Face Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 168, 225
(2012).
6. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recording as Heckling, 108 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3344815) (citing Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 167, 175–76 (2017)) (noting that Kaminski advocated that “recording’s
situated, physical privacy harms be balanced against recording’s expressive
interests under an intermediate scrutiny time, place, manner test”); Seth F.
Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse,
and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 395–96 (2011) (suggesting that
balancing privacy against recording might be appropriate under Supreme Court
jurisprudence); Marc J. Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped):
Reconceiving First Amendment Protection for Information Gathering in the Age
of Google Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 197–98 (2013) (arguing that
First Amendment right to record could be overcome by legitimate government
interests in privacy). For a general debate on challenges of information privacy,
see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN L. REV.
1049 (2000).
7. Amelia J. Uelmen, Crime Spectators and the Tort of Objectification, 12 U.
MASS. L. REV. 68, 75 (2017). Uelmen writes that taking pictures of people in their
everyday activity “may also be problematic and morally wrong,” however she
distinguishes those instances from her proposed tort which imagines the
scenarios where the victim is vulnerable and in need of emergency assistance. Id.
at 110. She opines, “Limiting the tort to encounters with a vulnerable person in
need of emergency assistance helps to keep the harm complained of within
judicially cognizable limits.” Id. at 116.
8. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of
Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140 (2006).
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that “recognize and legally protect the need for dignity.”9
Others have addressed the unwanted consequences of use of
facial recognition technology.10 None have addressed the
concern of widespread dissemination of images on social
media platforms persuasively, or given attention to the role
that tort law might play in defining new wrongs related to
the dissemination of one’s image in cyberspace and
“empowering private parties to initiate proceedings designed
to hold tortfeasors accountable.”11
In the age of social media, the unwanted dissemination
of the videos and images of an individual causes a distinct
injury. Publications on social media are “instantaneous,
readily accessible by both recipient and onlookers, . . .
cumulative, persistent, viral, potentially global in reach,
continuous, and unless arrested, permanent.”12 Unlike
human memory, the internet does not forget—one’s image is
retrievable years after an incident. Yet the currently
recognized privacy torts do not help in addressing this new
injury. The most relevant tort—appropriation of likeness—
renders persons liable for appropriating another’s image, but
in several states13 only when they do so for commercial gain.
14 Furthermore, as in the Clearview AI facial recognition app
9. ANNE S.Y. CHEUNG, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG FACULTY OF LAW,
REVISITING PRIVACY AND DIGNITY: ONLINE SHAMING IN THE GLOBAL E-VILLAGE 11
(2014) (noting that “such dignity should prevail over the right of freedom of
expression in the case of online shaming”).
10. Welinder, supra note 5, at 168 (calling for a regulation on facial
recognition technologies).
11. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEXAS
L. REV. 917, 946–47 (2010) (introducing the civil recourse theory in torts and
stating “tort law provides victims with an avenue of civil recourse against those
who have committed relational and injurious wrongs against them”).
12. SIR MICHAEL TUGENDHAT & IAIN CHRISTIE, THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE
MEDIA 760 (N. A. Moreham & Sir Mark Warby eds., 3d ed. 2016).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part I. For a study of the challenges and limitations of the
existing tort privacy see Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy,
9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. REV. 357 (2011); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
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case, there are ways that the use of one’s publicly available
image does not fall into the premises of the appropriation of
likeness tort standard. The action for violations of the right
of publicity, too, is limited. It only protects celebrities and
owners of celebrities’ images, not so much the ordinary
persons.15
The federal Communication Decency Act (“CDA”) only
intensifies the need for recognizing a common law cause of
action.16 Section 230(c) limits the liability of internet service
providers,17 including the liability of websites that post
others’ content.18 Section 230 was “written long before
Facebook or Twitter existed.”19 With its shortcomings and
the apparent unwillingness of the Congress to address the
criticisms over the statute,20 this Article looks to the common
law of torts to find a path forward.
Building on the mainstream privacy torts, the tort this
Article proposes allows courts to further promote privacy in
public spaces, foster responsible behavior among social
media users, and compensate the injured. For this proposed
tort, the injury is the retrievable visibility caused by the
unwanted broadcast of one’s image which renders the

15. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012) (stating “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to
material described in paragraph (1)”).
17. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
American Online immune from liability for delayed removing of defamatory
content posted by third party).
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
19. Sarah Jeong, Politicians Want to Change the Internet’s Most Important
Law. They Should Read It First, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/opinion/section-230-political-neutrality.html.
20. See infra Part III.
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individual powerless over one’s presence in public, taking
away one’s power over self-presentation for an undetermined
period of time.
Of course, any privacy tort must conform to First
Amendment limitations and, in particular, modern courts’
expansive conception of what counts as newsworthy and
therefore protected speech. However, the terms on which
liability will be imposed under the tort advocated here
comport with constitutional principles. By recognizing the
exception of newsworthy content explained in Part III, the
tort of unwanted broadcast will work side by side with the
other privacy torts such as appropriation of likeness.
To justify the proposed tort in this Article, Part I
provides a look into the social media industry and the issue
with the widespread publications. It then discusses the legal
options an individual may decide to pursue based on the
current available legal remedies in tort and copyright law.
Part I illuminates the shortcomings of each path in
addressing the privacy breach of unwanted broadcasted
images on social media platforms.
Part II examines the new privacy tort recognized by U.K.
law, and the European Union’s approach to the unwanted
publication of images and the recognition of the right to be
forgotten. Each approach supports the idea of a greater
protection for privacy. The right to be forgotten in Europe,
while including all data—visual and nonvisual—not only
demonstrates the missing part that exists in the U.S. legal
discourse, but also the possibility for bold moves that provide
a greater protection of individuals’ rights of privacy. Part II
then turns to a theoretical examination of the nature of
privacy and whether the proposed tort is supported by any of
several widely recognized privacy theories. It examines
ongoing debates on what privacy is and relates the
theoretical framework to the proposed tort of unwanted
broadcasting.
Part III proposes the new tort of unwanted broadcasting,
focusing on traditional notions of physical presence and
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boundaries in public spaces. Part III also addresses and
rebuts First Amendment objections to the recognition of this
tort and elaborates on the exception to the proposed tort.
PART I
A. Social Media and Life in Public
The rise of social media platforms such as Instagram,
Twitter, and Facebook have created an unprecedented
degree of image sharing. From drinking a cup of coffee to
diving deep in the ocean, it is common now for people to
constantly record everyday activities. This billion-dollar
industry21 has created a platform for many voices.22 From
cooks blogging about food to social activists fighting for a
cause, social media facilitate publications that reach
unprecedented audiences. In the new social network era,
Instagramers, influencers, and social media sensations
generate income from the content of their pages.23 They are
also “chasing users” unstoppably.24 Some go as far as
purchasing followers to showcase, falsely, their popularity.25
21. Emily McCormick, Instagram Is Estimated to Be Worth More than $100
Billion, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 25, 2018, 1:26 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-06-25/value-of-facebook-s-instagram-estimated-to-top-100billion (last updated June 25, 2018, 2:17 PM).
22. For a discussion on the overwhelming false speech on social media
platforms see Louis W. Tompros, Richard A. Crudo, Alexis Pfeiffer & Rahel
Boghossian, The Constitutionality of Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social
Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J. OF
L. & TECH. 65 (2017).
23. See, e.g., Jules Schroeder, 5 Millennial Instagramers Share How They Get
Paid To Travel The World, FORBES (June 29, 2017, 4:09 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/julesschroeder/2017/06/29/5-millennial-instagramersshare-how-they-get-paid-to-travel-the-world/#59a5226647fd.
24. Dante Disparte, Facebook And The Tyranny Of Monthly Active Users,
FORBES (July 28, 2018, 5:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dantedisparte/
2018/07/28/facebook-and-the-tyranny-of-monthly-active-users/#251d6c796aea.
25. See, e.g., Natalie Robehmed, For Sale: Instagram Followers and Likes,
FORBES (July 19, 2012, 10:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalie
robehmed/2012/07/19/for-sale-instagram-follows-and-likes/#5564427617ce;
Madeline Buxton, It’s Insanely Easy To Buy Thousands Of Instagram Followers
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To generate revenue or attract audiences, Instagram
users may and do use pictures and stories of other
individuals to either mock, shame, tease or to just have fun
at the expense of others’ privacy. As Tim Wu notes, “The
forces of wealth creation no longer favor the expansion of
privacy but work to undermine it.”26
What is missing in debates surrounding social media is
the power of a retrievable posted image. An enduring
photograph can reveal much more than a real-time live
observation. It “may capture more information than even a
careful observer would perceive, will preserve that
information in a potentially permanent form, and can be
used to communicate more information more efficiently than
mere words easily could.”27 In any given day, whether we like
it or not, we are in people’s cellphone video clips, souvenir
pictures, and more. It is the reality of our times. The law does
not provide one with a legal basis to oppose being
photographed randomly on the streets. Yet, being
photographed in public spaces is not the same as having
one’s image circulated widely on the Internet for millions of
people to see for an indefinite period of time. The fact is that
“[w]e act differently when we know we are ‘on the record.’
Mass privacy is the freedom to act without being watched
and thus, in a sense, to be who we really are—not who we
want others to think we are.”28

—But Should You?, REFINERY29 (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://
www.refinery29.com/how-to-buy-instagram-followers (last updated Oct. 18,
2018, 4:50 PM). Twitter reportedly took down around 70 million fake accounts in
May and June 2018. See Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter is sweeping
out fake accounts like never before, putting user growth at risk, WASH. POST (July
6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/06/twitter-issweeping-out-fake-accounts-like-never-before-putting-user-growth-risk/?no
redirect=on&utm_term=.894f54624d40.
26. Tim Wu, How Capitalism Betrayed Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/opinion/sunday/privacy-capitalism.html.
27. NICHOLAS J. MCBRIDE & RODERICK BAGSHAW, TORT LAW 600 (4th ed. 2012).
28. Wu, supra note 26.
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In limited cases on the social media platforms, such as
when an individual’s picture is used to impersonate her
identity by a third party, one has certain forms of recourse.
She can, for example, ask a social media platform to address
the issue, and they might well do so.29 However, besides a
limited number of exceptions, the individual whose image is
being circulated without her consent and against her will
cannot choose to stop the dissemination of her image once it
has begun. The harm of this form of instant and global
dissemination of images is of a different order, and the
benefits of publicizing such images in enduring retrievable
form are not palpable. The individual is forced into an
unwanted self-presentation that violates the individual’s
privacy.30 This is especially alarming considering the new
trends of deep fake technology,31 and facial recognition
apps32 that perpetuate unimaginable privacy harms.
Currently, the law affords individuals several tools to
address the unwanted dissemination. However, as this
Article illustrates, none are adequate to address the harm of
unwanted instant and global dissemination of imagery of
persons in public spaces via social media platforms with its
enduring retrievability.

29. Instagram’s help page, for example, gives guidelines on how to file a report
if you believe an account is impersonating you. However, you do need a
government issued I.D. If after filing your claim, the third party does not take
down your image, you are then asked to submit a photo of yourself, holding your
government issued I.D. in your hand, to further continue with your complaint.
This is a burden for countries where Instagram does not have an active presence
and the users may or may not be able to follow up with the rules. See
Impersonation Accounts, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/44666317538
2270 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
30. See infra Part II.
31. For more on deep fake, see, e.g., Chesney, Robert and Citron, Danielle
Keats, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National
Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. (Forthcoming 2019).
32. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We
Know It (Jan 18, 2020). https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/
clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html.
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B. Existing Recourses and Limitations
Analysis of liability for invasions of privacy under U.S.
law begin with Dean Prosser’s influential framework,33
which isolated four distinct privacy torts34 based on Samuel
Warren & Louis Brandeis’s call for a common-law right to
privacy.35 Later, Prosser argued the torts recognized by
courts following the Privacy article were not just one tort, but
“four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of
the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name,
but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that
each represent an interference with the right of the plaintiff
. . . ‘to be let alone.’”36 He described the four privacy torts as
follows: “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4.
Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the
plaintiff’s name or likeness.”37 The unwanted broadcast of
one’s image on social media falls between the cracks of these
categories.
1. Appropriation of Likeness and the Right to Publicity
For the tort of appropriation, Prosser initially suggested
the courts should first ask “whether there has been
appropriation of an aspect of the plaintiff’s identity,”38 and
next “whether the defendant has appropriated the name or
33. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
34. Id. Goldberg and Zipursky point to Prosser’s role as the lead reporter for
the American Law Institute’s Second Restatement of Torts in this widespread
adaptation as he “incorporated his article’s framework into the new
Restatement.” JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 331 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010).
35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
36. Prosser, supra note 33, at 389.
37. Id. at 389.
38. Id. at 403.
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likeness for his own advantage.”39 Today, the defendant in
the tort of appropriation of likeness must show the voice,
likeness or name has been used without permission “for
commercial purposes.”40 Commercial speech enjoys a lower
level of First Amendment protection, and recognizing what
constitutes commercial speech for the purposes of this tort
may not be easy.41
The facts of early leading lawsuits are illuminating. In
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., plaintiff appealed
from a lower court decision that had rejected her claim.42
Defendant, a flour company, had used Ms. Roberson’s
portrait to advertise their product without her consent. They
had spread about 25,000 lithographic prints and
photographs of the plaintiff in stores, warehouses, saloons,
and other public places.43 While, in 1902, no distinct action
for the invasion of privacy was recognized, plaintiff asked the
court to “enjoin a further circulation of the lithographic
prints containing her portrait made as alleged in the
complaint, and, as an incident thereto, to reimburse her for
the damages to her feelings, which the complaint fixes at the
sum of $15,000.”44
The court was not willing to recognize the property nor
the privacy rights of Ms. Roberson in her image, probably
influenced in part by the then-prevailing strongly sexist
prejudices.45 The court opined:
39. Id. at 405.
40. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 335.
41. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Mo. 2003)
(discussing the different approaches jurisdictions have taken in identifying
commercial speech).
42. 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902) (superseded by statute).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 443.
45. See JESSICA LAKE, THE FACE THAT LAUNCHED A THOUSAND LAWSUITS, THE
AMERICAN WOMEN WHO FORGED A RIGHT TO PRIVACY 67 (2016) (“[C]hief Justice
Parker’s inability to identify with her meant he could not understand or
empathize with her plight, which led to his unwillingness to provide her with a
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The so-called “right of privacy” is, as the phrase suggests, founded
upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through this world,
if he wills, without having his picture published, his business
enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written up for the
benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented upon either in
handbills, circulars, catalogues, periodicals, or newspapers; and,
necessarily, that the things which may not be written and published
of him must not be spoken of him by his neighbors, whether the
comment be favorable or otherwise.46

In rejecting Ms. Roberson’s claim, the New York Court of
Appeals noted that “she has been caused to suffer mental
distress where others would have appreciated the
compliment to their beauty implied in the selection of the
picture for such purposes.”47 Justice Parker pointed out, “The
likeness is said to be a very good one, and one that her friends
and acquaintances were able to recognize.” 48
Consequently, the New York legislature enacted a
statute that recognized a right of publicity in its civil code:49
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within
this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade
without the written consent first obtained [as provided in Civil
Rights Law § 50] may maintain an equitable action . . . to prevent
and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages
for any injuries sustained by reason of such use . . . .50

Meanwhile, at about the same time, the Georgia
Supreme Court in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. took
a different path and recognized liability for misappropriation
of likeness.51 In Pavesich, plaintiff brought a suit against an
insurance company that had used his picture in an
advertisement. Mr. Pavesich was not a famous man, yet the
remedy.”).
46. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 442.
49. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019).
50. Id.; see also Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 97 N.E.3d 389,
393 (N.Y. 2018) (citing Civil Rights Law § 51).
51. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
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court recognized that even if he was, it did not mean that his
picture could be “displayed in places where he would never
go to be gazed upon, at times when and under circumstances
where if he were personally present the sensibilities of his
nature would be severely shocked.”52
Goldberg and Zipursky categorize the three protected
interests of the tort of appropriation of likeness as follows: a
privacy interest against unwanted exposure, an autonomy
interest in controlling the presentation of one’s image to
others, and an economic interest in the value of one’s
image.53
Yet, some aspects of the tort gradually became
associated with celebrity rights and economic gains over the
years of its development and moved further away from its
initial natural law basis.54 In an article written by Harold R.
Gordon in 1960, the author encouraged the recognition of a
distinct right of appropriation—for commercial exploitation
rather than injury to feelings55—that would help the
confused courts address the lawsuits involving commercial
exploitation of public figures.56 With Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broad. Co.57—the only case to date involving this
tort that has gone to the U.S. Supreme Court—an
independent right of publicity was boosted.58
52. Id. at 80.
53. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 336.
54. See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 71 (“The right of privacy within certain limits is
a right derived from natural law, recognized by the principles of municipal law,
and guaranteed to persons in this state both by the Constitutions of the United
States and of the state of Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no
person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law.”).
55. Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and
History, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 553, 613, 555 (1960).
56. See JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 73 (2018).
57. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
58. 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977). The Court rejected the First Amendment
defense and allowed certain publicity cases to be heard despite the mandate of
First Amendment on free speech and newsworthiness. Id. at 578. The plaintiff
had filed the lawsuit when 15 seconds of his performance as a human cannonball
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In Zacchini, the Court explained that “[t]he State’s
interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to
encourage such entertainment”59 and that “[t]he State’s
interest is closely analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap
the reward of his endeavors and having little to do with
protecting feelings or reputation.”60
Later, in Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.61
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wrote: “The
right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial
interest of celebrities in their identities. The theory of the
right is that a celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the
promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that
may be protected from the unauthorized commercial
exploitation of that identity.”62 In such cases, “celebrities are
not injured by the exposure in the media,”63 they only want
to be compensated for it. Many lawsuits involving the right
of publicity are now similar to lawsuits involving intellectual
property rights.64 For example, in White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc. the court ruled in favor of Vanna White, a T.V.
personality who claimed Samsung had infringed her
publicity by using a robot in an advertisement that looked
like her.65 Right of publicity, as a result of this development

was recorded and broadcasted on tv by a freelance reporter. Id. at 564.
59. Id. at 573.
60. Id.
61. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 835.
63. MICHAEL D. MURRAY, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN A NUTSHELL 21 (2018).
64. WESTON ANSON, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: ANALYSIS, VALUATION AND THE LAW 5
(2015). Anson states, “The right of publicity falls outside the parameters of the
three main areas of intellectual property—copyrights, trademarks, and patents—
however most IP attorneys typically spend their time.” “However, the federal
courts and the vast majority of state courts agree that the right of publicity is an
IP right, and that it is an overlooked IP right in many cases.” Id.
65. 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992).

156

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

and its distinct features from the tort of appropriation of
likeness, now survives the death of the celebrity whose image
is being used, whereas the appropriation of likeness tort is
personal and does not survive the death of the person whose
image is being used.66As a result, right of publicity claims
remain in the hands of the famous who want to recoup lost
economic gains.
As for the tort of appropriation of likeness, courts
generate different outcomes depending on the local statute
and the method of analyzing the harm. The Second
Restatement of Torts, too, notes commercial gain is generally
not a requirement of an appropriation of likeness claim.67
Nevertheless, today, statutes in New York,68 Oklahoma,69
Utah,70 and Virginia71 require the tort of appropriation of
likeness to involve an economic gain for the defendant.72 In
Binion v. O’Neal, for example, plaintiff was initially able to
commence an invasion of privacy claim and avoid a motion
to dismiss.73 The 23 year-old plaintiff who suffered from a
medical condition had posted his own picture on his public
Instagram account. Defendant, a famous former basketball
player, posted one of those pictures with his own face next to
it on his Instagram account with more than 8 million

66. For a discussion on the differences of appropriation of likeness and the
right of publicity, see Kathryn Riley, Misappropriation of Name or Likeness
versus Invasion of Right of Publicity, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 587, 590–91
(2001).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
68. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019).
69. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449 (West 2019).
70. See, e.g., Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 565 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim of appropriation of likeness, reasoning that it
had no intrinsic value. Thus, the plaintiff could not maintain an action for
appropriation of likeness under UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-3. Id. at 564.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (2019).
72. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
73. No. 15-60869-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2016 WL 111344, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 11, 2016).
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followers, mocking the young man. Plaintiff sued O’Neal for
appropriation of likeness, among other privacy torts.
Defendant argued the plaintiff appropriation claim fails
“because Binion lacks a significant pecuniary or commercial
interest in his identity.”74 Applying Michigan law, the court
held in favor of the plaintiff since Michigan does not require
defendants to make commercial use of an image for the tort
of misappropriation.75 Although the case was later resolved
through mediation,76 it was a victory for a non-celebrity to
make a valid appropriation of likeness claim.
Nevertheless, the various approaches different
jurisdictions take in handling the appropriation of likeness
lawsuits do not create a unified protection for individuals
whose pictures and video recordings are easily shared on
social media accounts without their consent. The privacy tort
of appropriation of likeness was initially a response to
unwanted exposure. In the face of the social media age and
the emerging ways the tech industry enables the use of
images in producing new products, such as that of the
Clearview AI facial recognition app, there are harms that do
fall under the tort of appropriation of likeness umbrella. The
exposure and spread of images on social media platforms are
unlike anything imaginable even twenty years ago. Many
claims do not involve celebrities and are not for economic
gain, making it very difficult to access the appropriation
right as a remedy. This limited scope may force plaintiffs to
seek refuge in the tort of false light. Below I will discuss why
false light also proves to be inadequate.

74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Asmi v. Nasir, No. 316208, 2014 WL 5690503, at *10 (Mich. Ct.
App. Nov. 4, 2014)).
76. Binion v. O’Neal, No. 15-60869-CIV, 2016 WL 614523, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
16, 2016), vacated, No. 15-60869-CIV, 2016 WL 3511940 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2016)
(showing that mediation was ordered before the case was dismissed).
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2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The tort of public disclosure of private facts is concerned
with the publicity of an aspect of one’s life. The Second
Restatement of Torts distinguishes between “publication”
and “publicity” to highlight the core of privacy torts. Unlike
the publication element of defamation, publicity means:
[t]hat the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public
at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The
difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be
oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication
that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public. 77

It is the element of publicity that gives rise to an
obligation to refrain from publicizing certain information
about an aspect of another person’s life that you are aware
of.78 In public disclosure of private facts, the tortfeasor has
obtained certain information about an individual without
necessarily intruding upon that individual’s privacy.
Nevertheless, she may be held liable if she gives publicity to
the private facts of that person’s life. This distinction is
crucial because tort law is recognizing, once again, that there
are aspects of our life that we do not want to be publicized,
even though certain people may already know them.
However, the subject matter of the facts disclosed should
pertain to an aspect of our “private life,” as opposed to our
public life, one which if publicized “would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern to the
public.”79 By these requirements, the tort carves out the
public life of the individual. Therefore, based on this tort,
there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the
plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye. Thus, “[H]e
normally cannot complain when his photograph is taken

77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
78. This is different from the tort of “intrusion upon seclusions” in which a
person (or an entity such as the government) intrudes upon one’s private space.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
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while he is walking down the public street and is published
in the defendant’s newspaper.”80 The Restatement’s
description leaves no room for the new harm identified in this
Article to be redressed by this tort. Notwithstanding, there
is still room for liability for what is not newsworthy. The
publication addressed in this Article is in a new space—social
media—with a global audience, one that makes the medium’s
peculiar qualities the reason why a specific tort needs to be
recognized to address the harm.
3. False Light
Another one of Prosser’s privacy torts is “[p]ublicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.”81
This tort involves “a false statement about the plaintiff that
affects the way third parties view her, and thereby harms the
plaintiff.”82 The Second Restatement of Torts defines the tort
of false light as:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.83

An example of the tort of false light is illustrated in
Duncan v. Peterson.84 In this case, a pastor filed a lawsuit
against his former church. The church had sent letters to Mr.
Duncan’s new church accusing him of unbiblical behavior.
The letters claimed he should no longer be able to keep the

80. Id. special note.
81. Prosser, supra note 33, at 389.
82. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 334.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E.
84. 835 N.E.2d 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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title “Pastor.”85 Mr. Duncan argued the letters were false and
violated his privacy. The Appellate Court of Illinois sided
with Mr. Duncan and noted that although the complaint did
not mention false light, “the alleged wrongdoing describes a
cause of action for the tort of placing a person in a false
light,”86 requiring similar elements to those specified in the
Second Restatement of Torts.
False light is not a thriving tort,87 and its four corners
remain vague.88 Nevertheless, the underlying basis for
recognizing this tort is the distinct harm of the spread of nondefamatory but false information, one which is undesirable,
“albeit in a manner that is often hard to pin down.”89 The tort
does not help in addressing the widespread broadcast of one’s
image on online social media platforms, yet it emphasizes the
range of privacy concerns the law is capable of protecting.
4. Copyright Protection
Can an individual find recourse through copyright laws
when her image is posted on social media platforms and
widely viewed without her consent? While it may be true that

85. Id. at 415.
86. Id. at 422.
87. See, e.g., Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008)
(declining to recognize the tort of false light); Denver Publ’g Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d
893, 894 (Colo. 2002) (rejecting the tort of false light as “duplicative of defamation
both in interests protected and conduct averted”); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878
S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1994) (ruling false light substantially duplicates the tort of
defamation and therefore rejecting the tort of false light).
88. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court extended the New York Times
v. Sullivan rule to private figures, ruling that they also need to prove actual
malice for a false light action. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 390. However, in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, the Court stepped back on the requirement of actual malice for
private figures in defamation lawsuits. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–46. Whether Gertz
also applies to false light claims, in light of Time, Inc. v. Hill decision, remains
unsolved. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E took no position on this
issue. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
89. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 34, at 334.
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“copyright infringement is essentially a tort,”90 copyright is
now an elaborate distinct body of law that has developed
particularly in response to advancements in technology.91
The Copyright Act of 1976 and its amendments continue to
provide guidelines for courts on the new challenges of
copyright law.
On social media platforms, copyright issues are
especially challenging “[b]ecause a growing number of social
networking sites allow users to post photos, videos, and other
digital files for public viewing, inevitably resulting in their
copying and distribution.”92 The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)93 tried to address some of these
concerns.94
In order to answer the initial question of whether one can
claim a right to her distributed image under copyright law,
it is necessary to define what counts as copyrightable
material. Based on the 1976Copyright Act, “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with aid of a machine or device” are copyrightable material,
which does not include “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”95

90. Sverker K. Hogberg, The Search for Intent-Based Doctrines of Secondary
Liability in Copyright Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 914 n.33 (2006).
91. Goldman v. Breitbart News Network, LLC, 302 F. Supp. 3d 585, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984)).
92. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites
and the DMCA: A Safe-Harbor from Copyright Infringement Liability or the
Perfect Storm, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2007).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
94. See Jessica Gutierrez Alm, “Sharing” Copyrights: The Copyright
Implications of User Content in Social Media, 35 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 104,
104 (2014).
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
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Through Section 301(a), the Act’s definition of copyrightable
materials preempts any state law to the contrary.96
Copyright protection is distinct from the right of
publicity.97 An individual’s persona, his or her name,
likeness, and attributes, is not a copyrightable work.98
Nevertheless, the two may at times conflict. When, for
example, the persona is depicted “in a medium associated
with copyrighted works.”99 In these cases, distinguishing
between the right of publicity and the copyrighted material
may be challenging.100
In Garcia v. Google, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected a
notion of publicity protection deriving from copyright
regulations.101 The court stated, “In broad terms, ‘the
protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright
law. . . . To the contrary, the copyright law offers a limited

96. On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
97. For a discussion on how copyright laws do not run afoul of the First
Amendment, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
TO KNOW 45 (2018).
98. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 47
(3d ed. 2010).
99. Id. at 731.
100. See, e.g., Brown v. Ames 201 F.3d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 2000) (deciding that
the publicity claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act); cf. Baltimore
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 665 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987) (ruling on preemption of the baseball
players’ rights of publicity). For a discussion on these two cases see COHEN ET AL.,
supra note 98, at 731.
101. 786 F.3d 733, 736–37 (9th Cir. 2015).
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monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to the creative
work of the author.’”102
Therefore, the copyright law too fails to protect against
the harm of dissemination of an individual’s image in the
manner identified in this Article. An individual does not have
a copyrightable claim towards her image taken in public.
Quite the opposite, the person who captures another’s image
may stand to gain a copyright to her creation.
Existing laws in the U.S. provide little or no basis for
liability for the dissemination of images of persons captured
in public spaces. In the next Part, I will explain how the
common law system of the United Kingdom handles similar
privacy violations to the one explained in this Article. I will
then examine the prominent privacy theories and offer a new
account pertaining to social media platform privacy.
PART II
A. Comparative Study of the United Kingdom Privacy Law
Among the commonwealth jurisdictions, the U.K. has
had the most dynamic evolution in its protection-of-privacy
doctrine.103 This is so even though the U.K. does not
recognize an “over-arching, all -embracing cause of action for
‘invasion of privacy.’”104 Historically, it protected privacy
through reliance on the equity doctrine of breach of
confidence. However, the House of Lords abandoned this
approach in Campbell v MGN, 105 in which it first recognized
the “tort of wrongful disclosure of private information,” also
referred to as “misuse of private information.”106 Now breach

102. Id. at 745 (citing Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir.2003)).
103. Samuel Beswick & William Fotherby, The Divergent Paths of
Commonwealth Privacy Torts, 84 SUP. CT. L. REV. (2d) 226 (2018).
104. Campbell v. MGN [2004] UKHL 22 [11], [2004] 2 AC 457 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
105. Id.
106. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 591.
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of privacy is seen as “the violation of a citizen’s autonomy,
dignity and self-esteem,” not as a breach of confidence.107 In
addition, the House of Lords recognized the tort of wrongfully
obtaining access to private information in 2010.108
In Campbell v. MGN, a newspaper called The Mirror ran
a story on the famous model Naomi Campbell.109 Under the
title “Naomi: I am a drug addict,” the article included a
picture of Ms. Campbell standing outside of a building after
a support group meeting.110 Ms. Campbell sued the paper for
damages for breach of confidence and demanded
compensation under the Data Protection Act of 1998. In
ruling in favor of Ms. Campbell, the House of Lords
recognized the tort of wrongful disclosure of private
information and later developed it in Mosley v. News Group
Newspapers Ltd.111
Two different views emerged in Campbell on the nature
of the harm suffered by a victim of breach of privacy. The
minority view, stated by Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann,
emphasized the importance of privacy as a way to preserve
and protect an individual’s dignity, personality, and wellbeing.112 The majority, however, “placed greater emphasis on
the emotional and psychological impact that the publications
had on the claimant.”113
The Court discussed the theoretical basis for the
protection of wrongful use of private information on grounds
of breach of confidence. However, the Court insisted that this
nomenclature was misleading.114 Lord Birkenhead wrote
107. Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777 [7] (Eng.).
108. Imerman v. Tchenguiz [2010] EWCA (Civ) 908 (Eng.).
109. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22.
110. Id. at [2].
111. See Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) at [232].
112. N. A. Moreham, Privacy in the Common Law: A Doctorial and Theoretical
Analysis, 121 L. Q. REV. 628, 634 (2005).
113. Id. at 635.
114. Cambell v. MGN Ltd. [2004] UKHL 22 [13], [2004] 2 AC 457 (appeal taken
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that the values underlying the European Convention on
Human Rights have larger applicability and are not confined
to disputes between individuals and public authorities.115
For the court, “the touchstone of private life is whether in
respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a
reasonable expectation of privacy,”116 and not whether the
information was within the sphere of the complainant’s
private or family life.117
Lord Hoffmann noted that the new tort “focuses upon the
protection of human autonomy and dignity—the right to
control the dissemination of information about one’s private
life and the right to esteem and respect of other people.”118 In
this regard, the information need not be secret: “what
matters is whether they can reasonably expect to retain some
control over its dissemination.”119 Lord Hoffmann further
wrote, “The widespread publication of a photograph of
someone which reveals him to be in a situation of humiliation
or severe embarrassment, even if taken in a public place,
may be an infringement of the privacy of his personal
information.”120
N.A. Moreham, a New Zealand privacy scholar, correctly
concludes from the this case, “privacy is about the protection
of autonomy and dignity and an intrusion upon those
interests will not automatically be less significant because
the claimant cannot point to any physical or financial
detriment which he or she suffered as a result of it.” 121

from Eng.).
115. Id. at [18].
116. Id. at [21].
117. Id. at [20].
118. Id. at [51].
119. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 595.
120. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22 at [75].
121. Moreham, supra note 112, at 635–36.
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Later in Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd.,122 the
court differentiated between the publication of a story in a
newspaper and the publication of a story accompanied by a
video clip on the newspaper’s website.123 The defendant had
used a hidden camera to record sexual activities involving
Max Mosely, the president of Fédération Internationale de
l’Automobile. The Court cited the opinion in D v. L which
said:
A court may restrain the publication of an improperly obtained
photograph even if the taker is free to describe the information
which the photographer provides or even if the information revealed
by the photograph is in the public domain. It is no answer to the
claim to restrain the publication of an improperly obtained
photograph that the information portrayed by the photograph is
already available in the public domain. 124

The Court ruled for the plaintiff and noted “it should not
be assumed that, even if the subject-matter of the meeting
on 28 March was of public interest, the showing of the film
or the pictures was a reasonable method of conveying that
information.”125 The English court rejected a mere broad
generalization that public figures must expect less privacy.
Instead, the court focused on a proportionality approach
which would determine privacy violations with a focus on the
individual circumstances of each lawsuit.126
The English tort of wrongful disclosure has a larger
inclusive scope than its name may imply to an American
audience. It has been used by ordinary—not celebrity—
plaintiffs “who have attracted the attention of the media,
such as victims of crime, people who suffer from unusual
illnesses, and the children of famous parents.”127 The robust

122. Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd. [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777 (Eng.).
123. Id. at [22]–[24].
124. Id. at [18] (quoting D v. L [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1169 [23] (Eng.)).
125. Id. at [21].
126. Id. at [12].
127. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 590.
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approach the English courts have taken in applying this tort
has helped remedy a wide range of privacy violations. Part of
this is attributable to Article 8128 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).129 The Convention
requires a higher degree of privacy protection compared to
the original protection offered by the English courts. For
example, the European Court of Human Rights held that
Princess Caroline of Monaco had a right not to be
photographed as she went about her everyday life despite the
fact that she is well known and was appearing in public.130
The success of a lawsuit by a celebrity in a similar situation
in a U.S. jurisdiction is almost unimaginable.131
Notwithstanding, recall that for the Pavesich court,
dignity was also a driving factor.132 In Pavesich, as I
discussed, the Georgia Supreme Court wrote that the right
to privacy in “matters purely private” is derived from natural

128. European Court of Human Rights Article 8 describes the right to respect
for private and family life:
1.Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. 194,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
129. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 592.
130. Id. at 609 (citing Von Hannover v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 24, 2004),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61853).
131. In a rare case, however, famous wrestler Hulk Hogan sued for damages
after a sex tape of him surfaced on Gawker, an internet media website. Gawker
attorneys claimed the publication of the sex tape was subject to the First
Amendment and newsworthy. The jury ruled in favor of Hogan. The fact that the
underlying privacy was a sexual act seems to have persuaded the court and the
jury. See Ryan McCarthy, When a Sex Tape Is Newsworthy: Privacy in the
Internet Era, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2016/03/04/us/Hulk-Hogan-sex-tape.html.
132. Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905).
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law.133 The court explained, “The right of privacy has its
foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized
intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be
called to establish its existence.”134
Moreover, the emphasis on “balancing” of the facts of
each case to decide whether the plaintiff is afforded a privacy
protection has allowed for an inclusive privacy tort in the
U.K.135 Based on this approach, a reasonable expectation of
privacy may extend even to circumstances in which an
individual is in public.136 The sharp public-versus-private
binary categorization of U.S. privacy jurisprudence
drastically limits the scope of invasion of privacy claim,
making it difficult for individuals to claim “privacy” in
“public.” By contrast, a softer approach to this binary can
realistically address the emerging privacy concerns.
Furthermore, persons subject to English law can benefit
from the recourse provided through claims for harassment
available under the Protection from Harassment Act of
1997.137 The Act defines harassment as causing a person
alarm or distress which occurs on at least two occasions,138
and allows for the imposition of liability on harassment
through speech.139 As such, it is a “flexible and effective
weapon in putting a stop to the activities of a persistent
online wrongdoer . . . .”140
Lastly, the English Defamation Act of 1996 in the U.K.
does not extend a protection to Internet Service Providers
133. Id.
134. Id. at 69.
135. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 593.
136. Id. at 601 (discussing Murray v. Express Newspapers plc [2007] EWHC
1908 (Ch), in which the court afforded privacy rights to J.K. Rowling’s 19-monthold son who was photographed in public).
137. Protection from Harassment Act 1977, c. 40 (Eng. & Wales).
138. Id. §§ 1, 2, 7.
139. Id.; see also TUGENDHAT & CHRISTIE, supra note 11, at 763.
140. TUGENDHAT & CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 763.
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(“ISPs”) as broad as the protection provided by CDA Section
230(c). In particular, an ISP on notice that it is transmitting
defamatory content is a publisher of that content. In Godfrey
v. Demon Internet Ltd., an English court ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, a British lecturer in physics who complained
against a bulletin board in which defamatory content about
him was posted.141 The board failed to take down the content
and was thus liable.
The U.K. later passed the Defamation Act 2013 to amend
the common law of defamation.142 Section 5 addresses the
liability of operators of websites and holds that the operator
is not liable if it shows it was not the one who posted the
statement on the website. In this situation, the defense is
defeated if the plaintiff shows that:
(a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who
posted the statement,
(b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation
to the statement, and
(c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in
accordance with any provision contained in regulations.143

Relying on the core principles of protecting the dignity
and self-control over information has also pushed the E.U. to
recognize a right to erasure, a.k.a. right to be forgotten. The
E.U. right to be forgotten not only protects images and video
recordings, but also personal information and data. After
Brexit, it is possible—not yet certain—that the U.K. citizen
will lose this right,144 and their alternative remains largely
through recourse available under English tort law. Below I
will briefly note how the protection functions.
141. Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd. [1999] EWHC (QB) 244 [3], [12]–[15],
[33]–[35], [2001] QB 201 (Eng.).
142. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (Eng. & Wales).
143. Id. § 5.
144. Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2017).
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B. The European Union Right to Erasure
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms sets out the
right to “private life.” E.U. residents also enjoy “Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data.”145
In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union
decided Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD).146 In this lawsuit, Mr. Gonzalez requested
that Google take down from the search engine a real estate
auction ad that listed one of his properties as having been
sold to pay his debts. The ad appeared in a daily newspaper
called La Vanguardia.147 Mr. Gonzalez complained the
online dissemination of the data violated his “right to be
forgotten.”148
The Court held Google’s activities include “processing”
within the meaning of Directive 95/46.149 It did not matter
145. Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
146. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317.
147. Id. paras. 14–15.
148. Id. para. 91.
149. Personal Data and processing of personal data was defined according to
Article 2 of Directive 95/46 which stated:
(a) “personal data” shall mean any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity; (b) “processing of personal data” (“processing”) shall mean any
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.
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that the information found by search engine “[had] already
been published on the internet and are not altered by the
search engine.”150 It further ruled that the search engine is
also the “controller” with respect to the processing of
personal data in that context.151
The Court reasoned that search results on Google are
data related to Mr. Gonzalez,152 who is entitled to “protection
of his rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of
personal data and that it has investigative powers and
effective powers of intervention enabling it to order in
particular the blocking, erasure or destruction of data or to
impose a temporary or definitive ban on such processing.”153
According to the Court, economic interest cannot justify the
search engine’s processing of such data.154
The Court stated that Mr. Gonzalez’s objection to the
processing of such data by the search engine, according to
Article 12(b)155 of Directive 95/46, was on point since the
objectionable data included not only inaccurate data but also
“inadequate, irrelevant or excessive in relation to the
purposes of the processing, that they are not kept up to date,
or that they are kept for longer than is necessary unless they
are required to be kept for historical statistical or scientific

Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
150. Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317 para. 29.
151. Id. para. 32.
152. Id. para. 80.
153. Id. para. 78.
154. Id. para. 81.
155. “Article 12 Right of access: Member States shall guarantee every data
subject the right to obtain from the controller: . . . (b) as appropriate the
rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply
with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or
inaccurate nature of the data.” Council Directive 95/46, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
31 (EC).
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purposes.”156 Therefore, “The information and
concerned in the list of results must be erased.”157

links

The final balancing of the right of the public to have
access to the information in dispute is for the court to
decide.158 The Court continued:
[T]hose rights override, as a rule, not only the economic interest of
the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general
public in finding that information upon a search relating to the data
subject’s name. However, that would not be the case if it appeared,
for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject
in public life, that the interference with his fundamental rights is
justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in
having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the
information in question.159

This decision introduced a new concept to the legal
debate surrounding the right to privacy. It was also
expanded in later decisions in Europe. The Spanish Supreme
Court ruled “that the right to be forgotten imposes
obligations not just on search engines but on newspapers and
publishers of the underlying content as well.”160 The court
placed the burden of technical developments to tackle this
issue on the newspapers.161 The German, 162 Belgian,163 and
156. Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317 para. 92.
157. Id. para. 95.
158. Id. para. 98.
159. Id. para. 97.
160. Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Fourth Year of Forgetting: The Troubling
Expansion of the Right to Be Forgotten, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1011, 1012 (2018)
(citing S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2015 (J.T.S. No. 545) (Spain)) (criticizing the expansion of
the right to be forgotten).
161. Id. at 1021.
162. Id. at 1025. (citing Hanseatic Oberlandesgericht, Hamburg, 7 Zivilsenat
[OLG, Hamburg] [Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, 7th Civil Division] Jul. 7,
2015, 7 U 29/12 (Ger.).
163. Id. at 1027 (citing Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], 29 April
2016, AR C150052F, http://www.cass.be (Belg.) (holding that a newspaper should
take down an archive of a newspaper article which wrote about the data subject’s
criminal drunk driving to make sure it will not appear on Google’s search engine
results)).
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Italian164 courts have required similar obligation for
newspapers as well.
The many instances of the implementation of the right
to be forgotten illustrates the influence of Google Spain
throughout Europe. While the European Court of Justice did
not rule on the geographical application of the right to be
forgotten, privacy regulators argue the right expands far
beyond Google’s European domains.165
The Google Spain decision is binding for “EU-based web
browsers, which means that private data can still be accessed
via US or non-EU search engines.”166 The right to be
forgotten, or de-linking unwanted personal information, in
the EU is also subject to a balancing test considering “the
nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for
the data subject’s private life [on one hand] and the interest
of the public in having that information [on the other
hand.]”167 Furthermore, while the removed data are no
longer accessible to the general public, the underlying data
remains in the search engine’s database. However, with this
approach, the EU court has created “a speed bump”168 for the
fast-growing industry.
The implication of such decision is a heavy burden on the
internet-based companies. It has been reported that since
2014, Google has received 650,000 requests for such
erasures.169 This right was later introduced in the General
164. Id. at 1029 (citing Cass., sez. un., 24 giugno 2016, n. 13161, Giur. It. 2016,
II, 1 (It.) (holding that the newspaper must pay damages to the data subject for
leaving the news article online for a long time).
165. Id. at 1031–32 (disagreeing with a broad reading of the case that would
apply the delisting right for Google’s users globally).
166. URSULA SMARTT, MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT LAW 97 (3rd ed. 2017).
167. Id. at 96.
168. Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 22, 2014)
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion (quoting
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger).
169. James Doubek, Google Has Received 650,000 ‘Right To Be Forgotten’
Requests Since 2014, NPR (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:44 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
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Data Protection Regulation170 as “Right to Erasure.”171
Outlining six grounds, GDPR establishes the right for the
data subject to demand the controller erase “personal data
concerning him or her without undue delay.”172
This discussion illustrates the feasibility of such
wholehearted approaches in balancing possible privacy
violations in cyberspace. Although the court in 2019
restricted the right to be forgotten to the EU member states’
jurisdiction,173 the right had an impact outside of the EU. An
example of the right’s influence in the U.S. emerged in June
2018 in California, the home of Silicon Valley. California
thetwo-way/2018/02/28/589411543/google-received-650-000-right-to-be-forgotten
-requests-since-2014.
170. Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing the Directive 95146/EC (General Data Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L
119/1).
171. The grounds under which the right is applicable are:
the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for
which they were collected or otherwise processed;
the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based
according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where
there is no other legal ground for the processing;
the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and
there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data
subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2);
the personal data have been unlawfully processed;
the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal
obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is
subject;
the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of
information society services referred to in Article 8(1).
Id. § 3, art. 17.
172. Id.
173. Case C-507/17, Google v. CNIL, ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-507/17# (“[C]urrently,
there is no obligation under EU law, for a search engine operator who grants a
request for de-referencing made by a data subject, as the case may be, following
an injunction from a supervisory or judicial authority of a Member State, to carry
out such a de-referencing on all the versions of its search engine.”).
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enacted an amendment to Part 4 of Division 3 of California’s
Civil Code, titled California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018,
beginning in January 2020. Following the EU right-to-beforgotten model, California has recognized the right to
request deletion of personal information from businesses.
The new bill “would grant a consumer the right to request
deletion of personal information and would require the
business to delete upon receipt of a verified request, as
specified.”174 According to section 1798.192 of California’s
code the right is not waivable by agreement between the
consumer and the business.175
The right to erasure in the European Union and its
possible influence in the U.S. is a double-edged example for
the U.S. legal system. On the one hand, it illustrates the
recognition of an individual’s interest in controlling access to
one’s images on the web in a wide range of legal jurisdictions.
On the other hand, the feasibility of a command to platforms
to remove an image shows the simple way out of the
dilemma. Notwithstanding, the current approach in the U.S.
and the unwillingness of the legislature to put pressure on
social media platforms forces us to look to the common law
tools to offer a way to protect the individual’s privacy interest
in her image. Building on these global approaches and legal
frameworks, the next Section lays out a normative theory of
privacy that mandates the protection of an individual’s
privacy interest on social media platforms.
C. A Privacy Theory Apt to Set Boundaries
There are numerous accounts of defining privacy. It
would be impossible to survey all of them, and this Section
does not do so. Instead, it will lay out the most prominent
and relevant privacy scholarship in the U.S.176 that can
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (Deering 2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2020).
175. Id. § 1798.192.
176. For a review of European scholars’ views on privacy and how it relates to
social media, see SEBASTIAN SEVIGNANI, PRIVACY AND CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF
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provide an account to justify privacy pertaining to one’s
presence in public spaces v. the exposure of one’s image on
social media. 177
As William Parent notes, “Privacy is a notoriously
elusive concept. And the family of concepts to which it
belongs is extraordinarily rich in complexity.”178 It is
“significantly vast and complex, extending beyond torts to
constitutional ‘right to privacy,’ Fourth Amendment law,
evidentiary privileges, dozens of federal privacy statutes,
and hundreds of state privacy statutes.”179
The Justices in Griswold v. Connecticut180 were also
divided on the underlying source of privacy in U.S. law. One
author writes:
Justice Douglas saw privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights,
Justice Goldberg saw it in the Ninth Amendment, and Justice
Harlan saw it covered by the due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The problem with this kind of defense of the right to
privacy is that some may not see it all. 181

Studying prominent theoretical analyses of privacy can
help us grasp why the tort of unwanted broadcasting is wellsuited in the pool of privacy harms. We can begin with
SOCIAL MEDIA 113 (2016).
177. In addition to common law privacy torts, a large array of privacy concerns
are addressed under federal and state statutory law. See, e.g., Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 2033 (1996); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”),
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 1974
(“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). These statutes are outside the scope of this
Article.
178. William A. Parent, Privacy: A Brief Survey of the Conceptual Landscape,
11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 21, 21 (1996).
179. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483
(2006) (identifying four main rubrics of privacy law: information collection,
information processing, information dissemination, invasion).
180. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 527 (1965) (ruling a ban on
contraceptives was unconstitutional and noting that “the First Amendment has
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion”).
181. James H. Moor, The Ethics of Privacy Protection, 39 LIBR. TRENDS 71, 73
(1990) (arguing for the intrinsic value of privacy).
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Warren and Brandeis, for whom “The right to life has come
to mean the right to enjoy life,—the right to be let
alone . . . .”182 A violation of privacy, in their view, is “a kind
of spiritual harm.”183 This is the privacy account that was
widely adopted by courts when Dean Prosser’s article framed
the four proposed torts.
Charles Fried’s theory of privacy, on the other hand,
focuses on the sense of “control” we ought to have over
ourselves. For him, privacy is not about secrecy and limiting
the knowledge of others about ourselves, rather “it is the
control we have over information about ourselves.”184
Scholars have argued that Fried’s view on privacy—
control over one’s information—is too narrow.185 For
example, if one voluntarily divulges personal and intimate
information about herself, does her control over publication
of this information mean that she has not relinquished some
aspects of her privacy? In other words, her control of the
publication of her personal and intimate information does
not undermine her relinquishment of her privacy.186
As Parent described it, “Privacy is the condition of not
having undocumented personal knowledge about one
possessed by others.”187 Parent recognizes a moral right to
privacy for several reasons: (1) “If others manage to obtain
sensitive personal knowledge about us, they will by that very
fact acquire power over us,”188 which is undesirable; (2) We
live in a society “where individuals are generally intolerant
of life styles, habits, and ways of thinking that differ
182. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 193. Warren & Brandeis cite Judge
Cooley for the phrase “to be let alone.” Id. at 195.
183. Moor, supra note 181, at 71.
184. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
185. Parent, supra note 178, at 23–24.
186. W. A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269,
273 (1983).
187. Id. at 269.
188. Id. at 276.
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significantly from their own,”189 meaning that they will
always desire privacy; and (3) “[W]e desire privacy out of
sincere conviction that there are certain facts about us which
other
people,
particularly
strangers
and
casual
190
acquaintances, are not entitled to know.”
In this view, individuals are “to be respected as
autonomous, independent being[s] with unique aims to
fulfill. Parent argues “anyone who deliberately and without
justification frustrates or contravenes our desire for privacy
violates the distinctively liberal, moral principles of respect
for person.”191
Today, the online world “has provided few gatekeepers to
safeguard the quality and the nature of our input.”192 We are
“[e]xposed, watched, recorded, predicted.” “[T]he inability to
control our intimate information, the sentiment of being
followed or tracked” is shaping our subjectivity.193 The new
technology has provoked legal scholars to offer new theories
for privacy.
Anita Allen has shifted the right to privacy to a
responsibility of an individual. 194 This, she argues, is an
ethical obligation in the age when many have made
“disclosure the default rule of everyday life.”195 She continues
to say that “if we are to take normative ethic seriously . . . we
have to be open to the possibility that some of what we do
and enjoy doing may not be ethically good or best.”196 Allen

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 277.
192. ADAM KLEIN, FANATICISM, RACISM,
DIGITAL SPHERE 147 (2017).

AND

RAGE ONLINE: CORRUPTING

THE

193. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED 217 (2015).
194. See Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Information Privacy?
64 ALA. L. REV. 845, 846 (2013).
195. Id. at 848.
196. Id. at 849.
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places the burden of control over one’s information privacy
on the individual as a duty owed to oneself.
Another scholar, Julie Cohen, notes that “freedom from
surveillance whether public or private, is foundational to the
practice of informed and reflective citizenship.”197 For Cohen,
privacy is a dynamic concept that is “shorthand for breathing
room to engage in the process of boundary management that
enable[s] and constitute[s] self-development.”198 This
account is enlightening in explaining the privacy violation
that unwanted online exposure causes an individual. The
boundary management account pertains to a social context.
It is in our relationship with others that the self acts in a
certain manner.
The relationship between dignity and its social aspect is
best described in David Matheson’s work on “dignity and
selective self-presentation.”199 Matheson describes why an
account of self-control is insufficient in defining dignity. To
act with dignity, he explains, “is to present aspects of oneself
to others in a selective manner, that is to reveal information
about oneself to different individuals, in different contexts,
in accord with one’s considered convictions about the
appropriateness of doing so.”200 Under this theory, “not just
any self-controlled action is relevant to dignity concern”;
practical dignity is a social phenomenon.201 By this account,
too, unwanted exposure on social media platforms is an
insult to dignity and a form of invasion of privacy, since it
has the power to “transform an individual’s behavior from

197. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013).
198. Id. at 1906. For more, see JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED
SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–20, 107–26 (2012).
199. David Matheson, Dignity and Selective Self-Presentation, in LESSONS
IDENTITY TRIAL ANONYMITY: PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWOKRED
SOCIETY 318, 327 (Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009).
FROM THE

200. Id.
201. Id.
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the nondignified to the undignified by altering the epistemic
relations carried by the behavior.”202
Today, the Internet has changed the way we think about
privacy. This is why the contemporary legal scholarship is
addressing privacy violations specific to the Internet. This
Article argues for an account of privacy that is also specific
to cyberspace. Privacy, however defined, is a notion that
comes to life in light of people and spaces. Different privacy
torts—for example,
intrusion upon
seclusion or
appropriation of likeness—each try to protect the privacy of
the individuals either in a designated space or from other
people. Social media has created a distinct space and
audience. Therefore, the centrality of “space” and “people” in
what privacy is, and how privacy torts or regulations protect
individuals urges us to legitimize a privacy violation when
imagery of persons is forcefully dragged from its
geographically physical presence into a cyber-“space”—social
media platforms—and viewed by “people” in that space
which has retrievable visibility as its distinct feature.
Social media platforms are not a space in their natural
form. Nevertheless, they are distinct cyberspace that one
may choose to be part of or refrain from. People’s behavior in
this space is commonly the topic of studies for psychologists
and anthropologists.203 It has provided scientists a different
world to analyze. It should also give legal scholars a chance
to harmonize the individual’s legitimate interests related to
that space.
This view requires the abandonment of the strict
dichotomy of public vs. private. Under the private vs. public
distinction, a person who steps in the public no longer has
privacy rights that can stop the use of unwanted
photography—unless, for the most part, one is a celebrity

202. Id. at 328.
203. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bail et al., Exposure to Opposing Views on Social
Media Can Increase Political Polarization, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9216
(2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/37/9216.
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who enjoys the right of publicity. A softer approach to this
binary distinction can realistically address the emerging
privacy concerns.204
In the age of social media, being in the eye of the public
in a public space is distinguishable from having a presence
on social media. One’s physical presence in public is limited
to interactions with those whom one sees or those who have
the ability to see the individual in person. We have control
over our interactions, and we plan according to the physical
geographical space we plan on being part of. For example, in
parks and streets,205 despite the random unwanted or
unplanned encounters,206 people can still choose to engage in
or walk past a protest that is taking place and choose their
level of engagement. One may change their path or hide
behind a newspaper (or at least one’s cell phone or tablet) to
avoid an encounter. If, on the other hand, our picture is taken
and posted on social media accounts with large numbers of
users, our autonomy over managing our presence in the
geographical boundary which we chose is taken away. We
have been forced into a different space with a different
number of audiences.

204. Neil Richards writes that separating private facts and public facts based
on the method Warren and Brandeis have put forward in their framework is
sometimes an impossible task as “[i]nformation can be in both categories at once
. . . or it can lie in the extremely fuzzy area between the two concepts, which are
themselves poorly defined.” He writes that the distinction poses a problem or the
free speech doctrine that the later courts, too, have understood “that although
the line between public and private makes sense in the abstract, it is impossible
to draw with any confidence or predictability in practice.” NEIL RICHARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 44–45
(2015).
205. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever
the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been
a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.”).
206. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 30 (2001) (discussing the benefits of an
unplanned encounter on a public forum in exposing individuals to different views
and ideas that they may not otherwise avail themselves of).
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Social media publications are in an enduring retrievable
form. As a result, whether in form of face-to-face chitchats,
when recognized on the street, or receiving e-mails,
unwanted social media presence consequently results in
unwanted interactions for an enduring time. Going viral can
even lead to losing your job.207 Privacy in the context of social
media means having the right to be in public without
worrying about appearing as content on someone’s social
media account. In that regard, our presence in a geographical
public space does not mean our consent to our presence on an
online platform. By stepping outside, our privacy in public is
only lost to the degree required to be present in a
geographically limited space, unless one consents otherwise.
In this regard, your privacy has been violated once your
image is disseminated on social media accounts without your
consent, subject to certain exceptions,208 and the individual
should be afforded the right to stop the unwanted
broadcasting of their image on social media platforms.
PART III
A. The Tort of Unwanted Broadcasting
Technological innovation regularly challenges existing
legal frameworks. Virtual reality worlds, for example, have
called for a new way of thinking about the rights and
obligations of the participants.209 In response to the Internet
of Things, some have argued for “an internet of torts.” 210 New
207. See, e.g., Kaelyn Forde, Inside online shaming, and the ‘viral infamy’ that
follows, ABC NEWS (July 7, 2018, 10:34 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/insideonline-shaming-viral-infamy/story?id=56200539 (outlining a series of recent
cases of public shaming via internet); see also Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the
Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age, 75 MD. L. REV.
1029, 1030–31, 1049 (2016).
208. See infra Part III.
209. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom
to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2043–47 (2004).
210. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts, 69 DUKE L. J. (2019)
(arguing for the expansion of civil liability in light of the internet-connected
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communications tools likewise create new problems that
require new solutions. When Warren and Brandeis wrote in
1890 of “a remedy for the unauthorized circulation of
portraits of private persons,”211 they could not have imagined
what “instantaneous photographs”212 would become.
In light of the widespread use and misuse of social media
platforms, this Article proposes “the tort of unwanted
broadcasting.” The injury in this tort is the unwanted
widespread broadcast of one’s image or video recording on
social media platforms with enduring retrievable visibility
which forces presence in a distinct space one does not wish
to be, that is, cyberspace.213 People have “a greater
expectation of privacy in places where only a few people can
see or hear them. . . . [P]eople quite reasonably adapt their
self-presentation efforts according to their assessment of who
can observe them.”214 When one’s image is broadcasted on
social media platforms, the individual’s autonomy in self
presentation is shattered. The tort of unwanted broadcasting
addresses the unwanted exposure and can be categorized as
a “communications tort—a category of legal causes of actions
in which people are harmed by speech acts of others that are
not otherwise protected by the First Amendment.”215

devices that constitute the Internet of Things).
211. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 195.
212. Id. (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”).
213. Legal scholars have written on the distinctness of cyberspace and have
argued for the “conceiving of Cyberspace as a distinct ‘place’ for purposes of legal
analysis by recognizing a legally significant border between Cyberspace and the
‘real world.’” David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1996). The distinctness of the
cyberspace, I believe, is also intuitive. We know it has become a different world
when, for example, you can find a grandmother or an old uncle who has little
understanding of how it functions.
214. N. A. Moreham, Privacy in Public Places, 65 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 606, 622
(2006).
215. Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 73 (2014).
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For better or for worse, there is no binding legal
definition of what social media is to this date. However, it is
helpful to depict the ways courts have been addressing social
media in their opinions. This is especially important since
this paper argues the specific nature of social media calls for
its own tort—one that can unify the heterogeneous field of
privacy lawsuits pertaining to social media accounts and
misuse of images.
One Supreme Court case which dealt with social media
was Packingham v. North Carolina.216 In this case, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the relationship between the First
Amendment and the modern internet.217 A North Carolina
law made it a felony for a registered sex offender to use social
media networks.218 The law defined commercial social
networking websites by setting out four criteria:
(1) Is operated by a person who derives revenue from membership
fees, advertising, or other sources related to the operation of the
Web site.
(2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more persons
for the purposes of friendship, meeting other persons, or
information exchanges.
(3) Allows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that
contain information such as the name or nickname of the user,
photographs placed on the personal Web page by the user, other
personal information about the user, and links to other personal
Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends
or associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or
visitors to the Web site.

216. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017).
217. Id. at 1736.
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(a) (2017) (“It is unlawful for a sex offender who
is registered in accordance with Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes
to access a commercial social networking Web site where the sex offender knows
that the site permits minor children to become members or to create or maintain
personal Web pages on the commercial social networking website.”).
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(4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social networking
Web site mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a
message board, chat room, electronic mail, or instant messenger. 219

Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared the
law unconstitutional in light of First Amendment values and
noted:
[T]o foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user
from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.
It is unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be
used even by persons who have completed their sentences. Even
convicted criminals—and in some instances especially convicted
criminals—might receive legitimate benefits from these means for
access to the world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and
to pursue lawful and rewarding lives. 220

The Court, however, did not define social media. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, voiced the concern that the
majority’s language “is bound to be interpreted by some to
mean that the States are largely powerless to restrict even
the most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any
internet sites, including, for example, teenage dating sites
and sites designed to permit minors to discuss personal
problems with their peers.”221 For Justice Alito, the North
Carolina law was not a content-neutral “time, place, or
manner” restriction that was narrowly tailored to serve a
legitimate government interest.222 He deemed it too broad
since the four elements the law gives in providing a definition
for social media networks also included “a large number of
219. Id. § 14-202.5(b)(1)-(4).
220. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
221. Id. at 1738.
222. Id. at 1739 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989)); see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“[E]ven in a public forum
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
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websites that are most unlikely to facilitate the commission
of a sex crime against a child.”223 Justice Alito observes that
“As the law at issue here shows, it is not easy to provide a
precise definition of a ‘social media’ site, and the Court
makes no effort to do so.”224
Lower courts have tried to define the platforms when
needed. In People v. Lopez,225 the California Court of Appeal
relied on the Oxford dictionary to determine the meaning of
“social media.” The court wrote that despite a lack of a
definitive legal definition, “a practical, acceptable, and
common-sense definition of the term does exist.”226
Therefore, defining social media platforms for the purposes
of the tort of unwanted broadcasting will not constitute a
problem. Courts have an understanding of the concept and
can enforce the tort when called upon.
Who, in the event of widespread online dissemination, is
the tortfeasor and can be held liable? Anyone who has
intentionally and without the consent of the subject
published the content—a photo or a video recording—on an

223. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1741 (Alito, J., concurring) (providing examples
such as Amazon.com and WebMD that fit within the definition of North
Carolina’s statute).
224. Id. at 1743 n.16.
225. People v. Lopez, No. H041713, 2016 WL 297942, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
25, 2016).
226. Id. (“According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘social media’ constitutes
‘websites and applications which enable users to create and share content or to
participate in social networking.’” (quoting Social media, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183739?redirectedFrom=social+
media#eid272386371(last visited Nov. 17, 2019))). In turn, “social networking” is
defined as “the use or establishment of social networks or connections; (now esp.)
the use of websites which enable users to interact with one another, find and
contact people with common interest, etc.” Social networking, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183739?redirectedFrom=social+
networking#eid139354807 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019). And “social network” is
defined as “a system of social interactions and relationships; a group of people
who are socially connected to one another; (now also) a social networking website;
the users of such a website collectively.” Social network, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183739?redirectedFrom=social+
network#eid139354802 (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
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online public platform can be held liable.227 However, to limit
the floodgate of lawsuits, an additional element of the tort
requires that the content reach, or be capable of reaching, a
large audience. For example, an online user who has 50
followers and publishes a video of an individual without
consent would not face liability. Admittedly, there is no
precise line to draw on this issue. Instead, a court should
consider the significance of a certain publication for the
person whose image is being published; its bandwidth; and
whether a reasonable person may find the online post widely
publicized. These criteria are non-exclusive and aim to only
provide a guideline for the courts.228
If the subject can prove that she does not have any
picture of herself available online, not even one picture, in
that case, regardless of the size of the audience, the
unwanted publication of her picture online should satisfy the
tort of unwanted broadcasting. In this case, one is too many.
This approach allows for preventing further privacy breaches
with undesired consequences, such as the one allegedly
committed by Clearview AI.229
What is the outcome of a successful lawsuit? The plaintiff
will be entitled to enjoin the defendant to take down the
original post. She will also be able to ask the court for
damages depending on the magnitude of the dissemination
and whether it involves additional socially problematic
behaviors such as mocking or shaming that target dignitary

227. According to the Stored Communication Act of 1986, private messages and
posts are not accessible by parties without the consent of the publisher. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b) (2012); see also Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court, 417 P.3d 725, 728 (Cal.
2018) (recognizing the right for defendant to subpoena the public information on
social media platform, while requiring consent of the author based on SCA to
subpoena private messages).
228. German courts have incorporated the size of the audience in their judicial
decisions on privacy. For the German courts, “The larger the
audience/readership, the more the scales will tip towards an injury to
personality.” PATRICK O’CALLAGHAN, REFINING PRIVACY IN TORT LAW 118 (2013).
229. See supra Introduction.

188

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

interests—both of which have no clear-cut legal remedy in
our current tort system.230
The Second Restatement of Torts notes that “liability
clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”231 For
insults, dignitaries, and similar behaviors, the Restatement
calls on individuals to be “hardened to a certain amount of
rough language.”232 However, when coupled with a post
online on social media, those same behaviors are aggravated
and should not be ignored. As one author rightly points out,
“Information speech restrictions like the right to be forgotten
are appealing because they speak to a new collective
danger . . . in going about your daily life, your actions might
suddenly be held under a microscope, or broadcast to the
world, and replayed on infinite loop.”233 The tort of unwanted
broadcasting can also address this doctrinal void wrongfully
justified by calling to be tough.
This tort also works to address in part the shortcomings
of the U.S. Communication Decency Act § 230(c).234 As

230. Despite the recognitions of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED), the high bar to satisfy the tort—an outrageous act— has left many
uncompensated. See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark.), appeal
dismissed, 138 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting an IIED claim and noting that
the sexual advances made by President Bill Clinton did not amount to
“outrageous” conduct to satisfy the tort of IIED).
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
232. Id.
233. Klonick, supra note 207, at 1061.
234.
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable
on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (1).
47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(2) (West 2019).
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interpreted by the courts, this widely criticized statute235
inverts the traditional common law “republication rule,”236
eliminating it for ISPs.237 By virtue of this statute, one who
owns or operates a website, and posts a defamatory
statement or image initially authored or captured by
someone else cannot be held liable.238 While a discussion of
the shortcomings of § 230(c) are beyond the scope of this
piece, it clearly leaves open the possibility of liability being
imposed on the original author or publisher. Hence, the tort
of unwanted broadcasting can apply to the original publisher
of an image or video recording.
In reality, finding the original publisher is not easy. The
original author of the publication may hide behind a fake
name and identity. And, while a plaintiff may ask a court to
subpoena the social media platform (or ISP) to release the
identity of the publisher,239 such a procedure is both costly
and limited in its effectiveness.240 This is not to say the tort

235. See, e.g., Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV.
203, 208 (2018) (“The CDA immunity doctrine, born over two decades ago, is at
odds with the world as it is today. Internet intermediaries are structuring online
content, conduct, and the entire networked environment in ways that the current
doctrine does not contemplate. The consequences of this failing are troubling and
require reform.”); Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will
Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
401, 401–04 (2017); Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Monsanto Lecture: Online
Defamation, Legal Concepts, and The Good Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 1
(2016) (calling for a closer look at tort law principles in libel law—specifically the
republication rule—in regulating speech and interpreting 230(c) that would not
result in total immunity).
236. Sylvain, supra note 235, at 211–12.
237. See Zipursky, supra note 235, at 4 (noting that based on the common law
republication rule “a speaker who writes or speaks a defamatory statement made
by another is liable as if he or she were the speaker herself”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
238. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section.”).
239. TUGENDHAT & CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 774.
240. Anonymous speech is a guaranteed First Amendment right which also
applies to an online speech. See Anonymous Online Speakers v. U.S. Dist. Court,
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of unwanted broadcasting is unable to redress the privacy
violation; however, its limited scope removes the worry of a
floodgate of lawsuits.
B. Exceptions
1. The First Amendment
Internet broadly, and social media platforms specifically,
have provided numerous platforms for speech of any kind,
including cheap speech which “may be used to attack, harass,
and silence as much as it is used to illuminate or debate. And
the use of speech as a tool to suppress speech is, by its nature,
something very challenging for the First Amendment to deal
with.”241 Nevertheless, American exceptionalism on free
speech provides an obstacle in proposing any form of
limitation on speech. As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the First Amendment provides strong protection to any
speech that fits the broad definition of “newsworthy.”

661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the right is not unlimited and “the
degree of scrutiny varies depending on the circumstances and the type of speech
at issue.” Id. While political speech has the highest degree of protection, id. (citing
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 (1988)), other purely private speech, including
defamatory speech or commercial speech, enjoys a lesser degree of protection. See,
e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
(holding that purely private speech, such as commercial speech, enjoys a lower
level First Amendment protection). There is no consensus on the requirements
necessary to unmask the identity of an online speaker and the courts’ power in
issuing subpoenas. See, e.g., Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770
S.E.2d 440, 445 (Va. 2015) (holding that the circuit court was not empowered to
enforce a non-party subpoena duces tecum which directed Yelp to produce
documents located in California for a defamation action brought in Virginia). It
therefore remains a question for the courts to decide whether the degree of harm
in each case of unwanted broadcasting outweighs the required protection for
anonymous speech. For a discussion of the level of privacy afforded to social
media communications and posts, see Brian Mund, Social Media Searches and
the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 239 (2018)
(describing how the current law affords no reasonable expectation of privacy to
social media communications based on third-party doctrine). Mund argues for a
stronger Fourth Amendment requirement to protect citizens from baseless
searches of social media profiles.
241. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L. REV. 547, 549
(2018).
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In New York Times v. Sullivan,242 the court announced
that tort law regulations on speech (specifically the tort of
defamation) are in nature state-action restrictions on free
speech that are subject to the First Amendment. The
dominant “marketplace of ideas”243 conception, and case law
following New York Times v. Sullivan, have left little space
for unprotected speech.244 In addition to public officials and
general-purpose public figures, the limited-purpose public
figure has further made it difficult for individuals to sue for
speech torts in the U.S. Recently, Justice Clarence Thomas
raised the concern of the scope of the First Amendment
application245 following the dismissal of a defamation case by
Kathrine Mae McKee, who sued Bill Cosby for defamation.246
In this climate, would the tort of unwanted broadcasting
create a limitation on speech contrary to the First
Amendment free speech doctrine? Two cases discussing the
privacy tort of publication of private facts provide a
background for determining a balance between the First
Amendment doctrine on free speech and the privacy tort
proposed in this paper.
In the first case, Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Supreme
Court held in favor of publication of the name of a rape victim

242. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964).
243. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376
(1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969);
Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
244. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not allow public figures to recover damages
for the IIED tort without showing actual malice). Some courts have held social
media users with large numbers of followers to be public figures. Cristina
Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE. L.J. 1320, 1395 n.357 (2017).
245. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 675–76 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
246. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Clarence Thomas Has a Point About FreeSpeech Law, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2019-02-21/clarence-thomas-has-a-point-about-free-speech.
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in a newspaper.247 The Florida Star newspaper had obtained
the name of the rape victim through the public police report
available at the Sheriff’s Department.248 The tension in the
lawsuit was between an individual’s right to privacy against
the publication of private information and the First
Amendment right accorded to the press. Declining to rule a
categorical judgment that would render any truthful
publication permissible,249 the court narrowed down the
question to and held that “where a newspaper publishes
truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.”250
In the second notable case, Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., the author of a book called “The Promised Land: The
Great Black Migration and How It Changed America”
revealed information about Haynes and his wife that they
considered private.251 The information included paragraphs
about the plaintiffs’ sex life, heavy drinking habits, laziness
and more. Relying on the implications of Florida Star, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expanded on the
newsworthiness element.252 Despite the humiliation the
publication brought about for the plaintiffs, the court
rejected plaintiffs’ claim and held that the information was
newsworthy. The court opined:
People who do not desire the limelight and do not deliberately
choose a way of life or course of conduct calculated to thrust them
into it nevertheless have no legal right to extinguish it if the
experiences that have befallen them are newsworthy, even if they
would prefer that those experiences be kept private. 253

247. 491 U.S. 524, 540–41 (1989).
248. Id. at 524.
249. Id. at 532.
250. Id. at 541.
251. 8 F.3d 1222, 1224–26 (7th Cir. 1993).
252. Id. at 1232.
253. Id.
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In these two cases, and other similar cases,254 when
deciding between privacy torts and the First Amendment,
the Court has ruled in favor of free speech.255 However, there
is a balancing test that courts take into consideration: the
newsworthiness criterium. Categorically limiting the scope
of privacy torts in favor of free speech means leaving wrongs
unredressed, whereas balancing the two by separating what
is newsworthy or of legitimate public concern can better
serve the society as a whole.256 This is especially true in the
Internet Age, where privacy violations have reached a whole
different level as discussed in the Introduction.
Similarly, newsworthy content cannot be protected by
the tort of unwanted broadcasting and falls outside of its
realm. The proposed tort seeks to protect ordinary people’s
images from unwanted broadcasting. Therefore, it does not
violate the First Amendment doctrine on speech as long as
the shared image is not newsworthy.
2. Other Exceptions
The tort of unwanted broadcasting may give rise to
concerns that such tort will have a chilling effect on
recordings and publications that try to promote social
responsibility and respectable behavior. Research shows that
“[w]hen individuals believe, rightly or wrongly, that their

254. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (ruling
in favor of free speech by unanimously rejecting the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim of a public figure); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443, 454–59 (2011) (rejecting the plaintiff’s IIED and invasion of privacy by
intrusion upon seclusion claims, among other claims, based on the First
Amendment doctrine, and ruling that picketing in front of a deceased military
member’s funeral was of public concern and therefore entitled to First
Amendment protections); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975)
(ruling in favor of a newspaper that had published a rape victim’s name).
255. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES
49 (2015).

IN

THE DIGITAL AGE

256. In stating the tort of public disclosure of private facts, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts also notes that the matter publicized must not be of legitimate
concern to the public. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST.
1977).
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acts won’t be attributed to them personally, they become less
concerned about social convictions.”257 To avoid the possible
chilling effect of social accountability, the tort of unwanted
broadcasting comes with its exceptions:
a. Police officers and public officials cannot have a claim to
this tort when performing their duties; being under scrutiny
is part of the officers’ official roles. Recording police while on
duty or posting their pictures on social media accounts is
protected by the First Amendment right to free speech and
press as observed in Fields v. City of Philadelphia. 258
b. Individuals who are photographed or filmed engaged in
criminal activity in public cannot enjoy this privacy
protection. The protection of law does not extend to outlaws.
Therefore, if a person is recorded or pictured while engaging
in an illegal activity, they may not invoke the tort of
unwanted broadcasting to stop the dissemination of their
image on social media platforms.
c. Artistic creations supported by the Copy Rights Act of
1976 and relevant laws are do not fall under the penumbra
of this tort.259 This will ensure there is no chilling effect on
artistic expression.
d. A user claiming innocent dissemination cannot be held
liable. I am borrowing the phrase “innocent dissemination”
from the English law defense as outlined in Defamation Act
1996.260 Section one of the act provides that a person has a
defense if he shows: “(a) he was not the author,261 editor or
257. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 58 (2014) (citing
PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 124–25 (2001)).
258. 862 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that while citizens have a right
to record the police, officers have qualified immunity in such settings). For a
discussion of the Fields case, see Third Circuit Holds Bystanders Have First
Amendment Right to Record Police but Grants Qualified Immunity to Officers
Involved.—Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2018).
259. See discussion on copyright, supra Part I.
260. MCBRIDE & BAGSHAW, supra note 27, at 568.
261. Defamation Act 1996, c. 31, § 2 (UK) (“‘[A]uthor’ means the originator of
the statement, but does not include a person who did not intend that his
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publisher of the statement complained of, (b) he took
reasonable care in relation to its publication, and (c) he did
not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did
caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory
statement.”262 Similar balancing factors can be used in the
online publication of the image or video clip in the tort of
unwanted broadcasting.
e. The tort should also be confined to wide publication on
platforms society considers social media. It is important to
distinguish social media from the rest of the functions of the
internet. As noted at the outset of this Article, an image
distributed via social media platforms becomes viewable for
an unprecedented number of people with the use of a single
hashtag. There is nothing inherently wrong with this
feature. Many positive social movements and protests that
have benefited societies, such as #MeToo, are recognized by
this very feature—hashtag activism.263 However, the harm
that can be caused is just as powerful, and the tort of
unwanted broadcasting mitigates these harms.
If tort law is to keep its regulatory role, a limited degree
of restrictions must be tolerated. Otherwise, “[t]he only way
to be sure tort liability does not deter speech is to abolish it
in all cases in which the harm results from speech,”264 which
is not a proposition worth fighting for. Tort law works in the
field of recognizing harms and redressing them by providing
an avenue to sue when one has been wronged. In a society
where “exposure is the norm, rather than the exception,”
statement be published at all[.]”).
262. Id. § 1. The new Defamation Act 2013 has introduced a regime to update
the innocent dissemination defense in light of online defamations. Defamation
Act 2013, c. 26, § 5 (Eng. & Wales); see supra Part II.
263. For a discussion on the role of hashtags, see Monica Anderson et al.,
Activism in the Social Media Age, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2018), https://
www.pewinternet.org/2018/07/11/activism-in-the-social-media-age/ (noting that
according to a Pew Research Analysis, as of May 1, 2018, one hashtag has been
used nearly 30 million times on Twitter alone).
264. David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 755, 777 (2004).
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recognizing a tort for wrongful dissemination feels like
swimming against the current.265 Yet, the unwanted use of
an individual’s photographs protected by the tort of
unwanted broadcasting incentivizes a higher degree of care
on social media platforms while allowing for the platform
and its user to enjoy its positive outcomes. The benefits of
this narrow limitation outweigh the cost of restriction placed
on individuals not to use another person’s images without
their consent.
CONCLUSION
With the advancement of technology, the line between
what is public and what is private has become thin. In
Warren and Brandeis’s words, “That the individual shall
have full protection in person and in property is a principle
as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary
from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent
of such protection.”266 We are now at a time where we need
to look at the meaning of our physical presence in public and
the privacy the law affords us.
Today, promoting economic or political agendas or
spending leisure time by exposing individuals’ images and
video recordings on social media platforms are the
unpleasant consequences of this new digital age. The
unwanted spread of video recordings and pictures of private
individuals through social media platforms which allow for a
retrievable visibility is a new privacy violation that needs to
be addressed effectively. Being physically present in public
and expecting the forgoing of a certain degree of privacy by
mere presence in public is one thing; allowing one’s image to
be publicized through the eye of millions for an indefinite
time, retrievable at any time, is another. This article,
building on common law of torts and its privacy
developments, proposed the tort of unwanted broadcasting
265. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 6 (manuscript at 31).
266. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 35, at 193.
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and sought to legitimize the grievance of retrievable
visibility. With its exceptions laid out in this article, the
proposed tort also promotes a culture of responsibility
amongst social media users.

